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There is a growing body of research indicating that bodily sensation and behavior
strongly influences one’s emotional reaction toward certain situations or objects. On
this background, a framework model of embodied affectivity1 is suggested: we regard
emotions as resulting from the circular interaction between affective qualities or
affordances in the environment and the subject’s bodily resonance, be it in the form
of sensations, postures, expressive movements or movement tendencies. Motion and
emotion are thus intrinsically connected: one is moved by movement (perception;
impression; affection2) and moved to move (action; expression; e-motion). Through its
resonance, the body functions as a medium of emotional perception: it colors or charges
self-experience and the environment with affective valences while it remains itself in
the background of one’s own awareness. This model is then applied to emotional social
understanding or interaffectivity which is regarded as an intertwinement of two cycles of
embodied affectivity, thus continuously modifying each partner’s affective affordances and
bodily resonance. We conclude with considerations of how embodied affectivity is altered
in psychopathology and can be addressed in psychotherapy of the embodied self.
Keywords: embodiment, affect, emotion, body feedback, embodied intersubjectivity, interaffectivity,
psychopathology, embodied therapies
INTRODUCTION
Emotions may be considered some of the most complex phe-
nomena of subjective experience. This is mirrored by the host of
different and often opposing emotion theories both in philosophy
and psychology. Of the many attempts to reduce the complexity
of emotions to a more simplified concept, two should be men-
tioned. The first focuses on their bodily component, as in the
famous theory of James and Lange (James, 1884), simply put: we
do not shiver because we are scared of the lion, but we shiver,
and this is what we feel as our fear. In other words, emotions are
feelings of bodily changes. This counter-intuitive assumption has
been widely criticized for neglecting the intentional content or
“aboutness” of emotions.
On the other hand, the contrary theory seems no less one-
sided: according to prevailing cognitive approaches (Solomon,
1976; Lyons, 1980; Nussbaum, 2001), an emotion mainly consists
in an act of evaluation or appraisal of a given situation. The bod-
ily experience of emotions is then regarded as just an additional
quale without further relevance (Gordon, 1987) or serving the
limited purpose to assure us that an emotion is going on (Lyons,
1980). Again simplified: we believe or judge the lion to be dan-
gerous, want to run away, and this is our fear of him. However,
belief-desire concepts of emotions have been notoriously unable
to capture their experiential and phenomenal aspect. A purely
1This model has formerly been introduced in a chapter on “The phenomenol-
ogy of affectivity” by T. Fuchs in Fulford et al. (2013). Some parts are reprinted
here with kind permission by the publisher.
2The term “affection” is used in the model in the sense of “being affected by
something.”
cognitive or functional approach to the phenomenon loses its
peculiar self-affecting character. In particular, it fails to account
for the changing intensity of emotions: it seems virtually impos-
sible to indicate what a more intense anger, shame, or fear should
be without referring to bodily experience (e.g., to one’s increased
sense of muscle tension, breath restriction, heated face or pound-
ing heart). Cognitions as such do not differ in intensity. We may
put the belief that “the lion is dangerous” into the compara-
tive “the lion is very dangerous,” or we may repeat the thought
with high frequency, but this does not yield a different affective
experience unless we feel the “very” or the repetition as express-
ing a more activated, tense or stressful bodily state (Lang et al.,
1993; Reisenzein, 1994). There is, however, no necessity and no
indication to impose a linear causality model upon the complex
phenomena of emotions (Boettinger, 2012). Given the divergent
and inconclusive findings under the assumption of linear causal-
ity, models of circular causality may lead to a more appropriate
understanding of emotional phenomena.
In the past decades a growing body of research on embodiment
has demonstrated that not only bodily sensations, but also bod-
ily postures, gestures and expressions are inherent components of
emotional experience and tacitly influence the evaluation of per-
sons, objects and situations as well as memory recall. To provide
some examples:
• Riskind (1984) found that individuals recalled more nega-
tive life events when sitting in a slumped position, and more
positive events when sitting in an upright position.
• Strack et al. (1988) demonstrated that activation of the smil-
ing muscle (by asking participants to hold a pen between their
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teeth) caused participants to judge cartoons to be funnier than
when smiling was inhibited by holding the pen between their
lips.
• Cacioppo et al. (1993) reported that Chinese ideographs pre-
sented during arm flexion (an approach motion) were eval-
uated more positively than ideographs presented during arm
extension (an avoidance motion; see also Neumann and Strack,
2000).
• Koch (2014; this issue) showed that an approach movement
of the arms and a receptive movement of the hands caused
a more positive attitude toward target objects than an avoid-
ancemovement; similarly, dynamic qualities of movement with
smooth transitions caused more positive affect and a higher
receptivity toward the environment thanmovement with sharp
transitions.
• Cuddy et al. (2012) found that when people stood or sat for
7min in a “power position” (different forms of extension of
the body), they performed better in a subsequent mock job
interview.
• Williams and Bargh (2008) showed that holding a hot cup of
coffee elicits a “warmer” (more generous, caring) impression
of a target person than holding a cup of iced coffee. Bodily felt
warmth thus directly affected the interpersonal impression of
warmth.
• Conversely, Zhong and Leonardelli (2008) found that peo-
ple estimated the room temperature as being colder than
before after they had experienced social exclusion from a
group. Interpersonal coldness was thus felt as physical coldness.
Correspondingly, Bargh and Shalev (2012) found that persons
who experience social loneliness show an increased tendency to
take warm baths or showers.
• The cleaning away of guilt is another interesting case: Meier
et al. (2012) report a number of studies showing that cleansing
can wash away feelings of guilt (Lee and Schwarz, 2011) or sin
(Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006), and had a mildness influence
on one’s moral judgment (Schnall et al., 2008).
• Last but not least, Havas et al. (2010) found that the injec-
tion of botulinum toxin (Botox) into the frowning muscles
impaired the understanding of negative semantic content such
as criticism in a text which subjects had to read. This indicates
that such understanding normally affords a slight frowning
movement. On the other hand, injection of botulinum toxin
into these muscles may significantly improve depressive symp-
toms in patients as has been shown in a randomized controlled
trial by Wollmer et al. (2012). Obviously, negative evaluation
of oneself as well as of semantic content is supported by
corresponding facial expressions.
These and related research results may be summarized as follows:
1. When individuals adopt or produce emotion-specific pos-
tures, facial expressions or gestures, (a) they tend to experience
the associated emotions, and (b) their behavior and also
their preferences, judgement and attitudes toward objects or
persons are thereby tacitly influenced.
2. Conversely, when individuals’ expressive movements are
inhibited, the experiencing of the associated emotions as well
as the processing of corresponding emotional information
is impaired. This is even the case when the information is
presented in a merely cognitive or non-expressive way (as
shown by the study of Havas et al., 2010, above).
Empirical findings thus show that embodiment has a far reach-
ing influence on our emotional life. How may this influence be
adequately understood? While we know that proprioceptive body
feedback (based on afferent neural pathways from the body to the
brain) is one of the responsible mechanisms (Hatfield et al., 1994;
Koch, 2011), its interplay with the emotional perception and eval-
uation of a given situation still needs to be clarified. If we want to
integrate the existing empirical research results into a comprehen-
sive model of embodied affectivity, it seems advisable to follow a
step-by-step approach: We will first consider emotions under dif-
ferent aspects, then we will try to integrate these aspects into an
embodied and enactive concept of emotions. Finally, we will apply
this concept to the special situation of social interactions or what
may be called “embodied interaffectivity.”
WHAT ARE EMOTIONS?
In a first approximation, emotions may be regarded as affec-
tive responses to certain kinds of events of concern to a subject,
implying conspicuous bodily changes and motivating a specific
behavior (De Sousa, 2010). Accordingly, we will consider emo-
tions under the aspects of (a) affective intentionality, (b) bodily
resonance, (c) action tendency, and (d) function and significance.
(a) Affective intentionality. There is wide agreement among
philosophers and psychologists that emotions are characterized
by intentionality—they relate to persons, objects, events and sit-
uations in the world (see e.g., Solomon, 1976; Frijda, 1994; De
Sousa, 2010). However, this intentionality is of a special kind: it
is not neutral, but concerns what is particularly valuable and rel-
evant for the subject. In a sense, emotions are ways of perceiving,
namely attending to salient features of a situation, giving them a
significance and weight they would not have without the emotion.
Referring to Gibson’s (1979) concept of affordances (that means,
offerings in the environment that are available to animals, such as
a tree being “climbable,” water “drinkable,” etc.), one could also
speak of affective affordances: things appear to us as “important,”
“worthwhile,” “attractive,” “repulsive,” “expressive,” and so on.
Without emotions, the world would be without meaning or sig-
nificance; nothing would attract or repel us andmotivate us to act.
Of course, this meaning-making implies an evaluative or
appraising component which should not, however, be conceived
in terms of propositional attitudes (believing that p is the case, for
example, believing that a lion is dangerous; cf. Lyons, 1980); oth-
erwise, emotions could not be experienced by small children or
higher animals lacking language. The evaluative aspect of affective
intentionality is not dependent on verbally structured judge-
ments, but on more basic cognitive-emotional schemes which are
acquired in the course of affect-inducing experiences. Thus, an
approaching lion will be immediately perceived and felt as a dan-
gerous object once one has heard a lion’s terrible roaring before,
seen its leap toward a prey, etc. It has then acquired a threatening
appearance which does not necessarily imply a belief such as “this
is a lion,” “lions are dangerous,” etc. Of course there are emotional
situations which are largely determined by higher forms of cog-
nition (e.g., if an emotionally relevant information is provided
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in written form, or requires abstract concepts such as knowledge
about an imminent stock market crash). But even then it is only
the embodied response to the recognized situation that mediates
its affective appeal and significance [see (b)]. Appraisal theories
are highly relevant for explaining different emotional reactions of
individuals on the basis of their preset attitudes, biases, beliefs, or
judgements. But they are insufficient, when it comes to explain
the holistic phenomenon of emotional experience itself 3.
Moreover, the appraisal component may not be regarded as a
mere cognitive judgement, because in emotions, oneself is affected.
They always imply a particular relation to the feeling subject in its
very core: through emotions, I experience how it is for me to be
in this or that situation. It is me who is surprised, hurt, angry,
joyful, etc. Affective intentionality is thus twofold: it discloses an
affective or value quality of a given situation as well as the feeling
person’s own state in the face of it (Slaby and Stephan, 2008). To
be afraid of an approaching lion (world-reference) means at the
same time being afraid for oneself (self-reference). To feel envy
toward another person means to begrudge her an advantage or
success as well as to feel inferior and dissatisfied with oneself.
Each emotion, thus, implies the two poles of feeling something
and feeling oneself as inextricably bound together.
(b) Bodily resonance. How do we experience the affective quali-
ties or affordances of a given situation? Emotions are experienced
through what we call bodily resonance. This includes all kinds of
local or general bodily sensations: feelings of warmth or coldness,
tickling or shivering, pain, tension or relaxation, constriction or
expansion, sinking, tumbling or lifting, etc. They correspond,
on the one hand, to autonomic nervous activity (e.g., raised
heartbeat, accelerated respiration, sweating, trembling, visceral
reactions), on the other hand, to various muscular activations,
bodily postures, movements and related kinaesthetic feelings
(e.g., clenching one’s fist or one’s jaws, moving backwards or for-
wards, bending or straightening oneself, etc.). Particularly rich
fields of bodily resonance are the face and the gut. Thus, for exam-
ple, sadness may be felt locally as a lump in the throat, a tightening
in the chest or in the belly, a tension around the eyes, a tendency to
weep, or globally as a sagging tendency or a painful wave spread-
ing through the entire body (Gendlin, 1967). Bodily resonance
is also related to Damasio’s concept of the “somatic markers,”
consisting of interoceptive and proprioceptive feedback from the
body that needs to be integrated with other more cognitive infor-
mation in the frontal lobe of the brain in order to guide one’s
behavior, in particular in every day decision-making (Damasio,
1994, 1996).
In sum, as William James put it, the body is a most sensitive
“sounding-board” in which every emotion reverberates (James,
3The focus of this article is on emotions. The various interfaces with cognition
result naturally from the intrinsic connection of emotion and cognition (e.g.,
Zajonc and Markus, 1984); to address them in the article would exceed its
scope and length. It would in fact not even be necessary, since each situation
that affects us emotionally does also concern us cognitively, and vice versa. I
have to recognize the lion in order to feel afraid of it; I have to understand the
words that insult me cognitively before they can create an affective affordance
for me. Just as there is no cognition without emotion, at least in the sense of
emotionally driven attention and interest, there is also no emotion without a
cognitive grasp of the given situation.
1884), both within and between us. In addition, our bodies have a
varying degree of permeability (“Durchlässigkeit”; Lewin, 1935),
affectability and responsivity (e.g., Stern, 1985; Trevarthen, 2009)
at any given point in time. The tired body is more permeable
than the wake body, the drunk body more permeable than the
sober body (Lewin, 1935). At the same time, these bodily feel-
ings have an immediate repercussion on the emotion as a whole:
Feeling one’s heart pound in fear raises one’s anxiety, feeling
one’s cheeks burn with shame increases the painful experience of
exposure and humiliation (Ekman et al., 1972). Therefore, bodily
feelings should not be conceived as a mere by-product or add-
on, distinct from the emotion as such, but as the very medium
of affective intentionality. Being afraid, for instance, is not possi-
ble without feeling a bodily tension or trembling, a beating of the
heart or a shortness of breath, and a tendency to withdraw. It is
through these sensations that we are anxiously directed toward a
frightening situation.
According to traditional appraisal-theories (Lazarus, 1982),
the evaluation of a given situation is a primary and separate com-
ponent of emotions which precedes any bodily changes. From an
embodied perspective, however, it is the lived body with its back-
ground sensations that is co-constitutive of the evaluation, which
means that we should rather speak of an “embodied appraisal”
(Prinz, 2004). For example, when feeling tired or exhausted, a
familiar way uphill appears steeper and longer than normally.
This appraisal does not result from a separate evaluative judge-
ment, but from the very mismatch between one’s bodily capacity
and the task one faces. The hill is “too high,” that means it is
perceived in this way through the tired, incapable body. Even
in cases where emotionally relevant information is presented in
merely abstract form (such as the text with negative content in
the Botox study by Havas et al. see above), the evaluation obvi-
ously also depends on the simultaneous bodily resonance. More
generally, our feeling body is the way we are emotionally related
to the world, or in other words, affective experiences are bodily
feelings-toward (Goldie, 2000). In emotions, there is no sepa-
ration between an appraisal and a bodily component for they
are only realized as a synthesis or “full circle” of all mutually
interacting components.
(c) Action tendency. Bodily resonance of emotions is not
restricted to autonomic nervous system activity or facial expres-
sion (which are in the focus of most empirical studies), but
includes the whole body as being moved and moving. Fear,
for example, does not only mean a raised heart beat or widely
opened eyes but also the urge to break free, to flee or to
hide (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999). The term “emotion” is derived
from the Latin emovere, “to move out,” implying that inher-
ent in emotions is a potential for movement, a directedness
toward a certain goal (be it attractive or repulsive) and a tension
between possible and actual movement. Correspondingly, Frijda
(1986) has characterized emotions in terms of action readiness,
according to the different patterns of action which they induce:
approach (e.g., desire), avoidance (e.g., fear), being-with (enjoy-
ment, confidence), attending (interest), rejecting (disgust), non-
attending (indifference), agonistic (anger), interrupting (shock,
surprise), dominating (arrogance), and submitting (humility,
resignation).
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Similarly, according to Kafka (1950) and De Rivera (1977),
there exist four basic emotional movements: moving oneself
“toward the other” (e.g., affection, mourning), moving the other
“toward oneself” (e.g., desire, greed), moving the other “away
from oneself” (e.g., disgust, anger) and moving oneself “away
from the other” (e.g., fear, disgust). The four are related to the
gestures of giving, getting, removing and escaping. These basic
movements are connected to a bodily felt sense of expansion or
contraction, relaxation or tension, openness or constriction, etc.
In anger, for example, one feels a tendency of expansion toward
an object in order to push it away from self. In affection, one feels
a relaxation, opening and emanation toward an object or person.
Emotions can thus be experienced as the directionality of one’s
potential movement, although this movement need not necessar-
ily be realized in physical space; they are phenomena of lived space
(Fuchs, 2007).
(d) Functions and significance. On the basis of the analysis so
far, the role of emotions for the individual may be determined as
follows: Emotions “befall us”; they interrupt the ongoing course
of life in order to inform us, warn us, tell us what is impor-
tant and what we have to react upon. They (re)structure the
field of relevance and values; some of our plans, intentions or
beliefs must be revised (Downing, 2000). Emotions thus pro-
vide a basic orientation about what really matters to us; they
contribute to defining our goals and priorities. At the same
time, they sketch out a certain scope and direction of possi-
ble responses, which are complementary to the meaning the
emotion gives to the situation. Bodily resonance, autonomic
arousal and musular activations make us become ready to act:
in anger we prepare for attack, in fear we prepare for flight,
in shame we want to hide or disappear, in love we want to
approach and be approached. Emotion may thus be regarded as
a bodily felt transformation of the subject’s world, which solic-
its the lived body to action. However, even when the action
tendency of emotions does not win through, they still retain
an expressive function: by indicating the individual’s state and
possible action to others, they serve a communicative func-
tion in social life which will be explained in the section on
“interaffectivity.”
AN EMBODIED AND EXTENDED CONCEPT OF EMOTIONS
We now have gathered the necessary components that may be
integrated into an embodied and extended model of emotions:
1. Emotions emerge as specific forms of a subject’s bodily direct-
edness toward the valences and affective affordances of a given
situation4. They encompass subject and situation and there-
fore may not be localized in the interior of persons (be it their
4As pointed out above, the concept of affective intentionality and affective
affordances also implies components of cognition (schemes, attitudes, beliefs,
etc.) which shape the individual’s emotional perception of, and response to
a situation. Perceiving a goal in a football match, for example, will elicit
quite different emotional responses depending on which team one supports.
However, the focus of our model lies not on such preset attitudes, beliefs,
biases etc. but on explaining the phenomenon of emotional experience as a
whole (for which the term “embodied appraisal” (Prinz, 2004) seems much
more adequate than the predominantly discussed “emotional appraisal”).
psyche or their brain). Rather, the affected subject is engaged
with an environment that itself has affect-like qualities. For
example, in shame, an embarrassing situation and the dis-
missive gazes of others are experienced as a painful bodily
affection which is the way the subject feels the sudden deval-
uation in others’ eyes. The emotion of shame is extended over
the feeling person and his body as well as the situation as a
whole (on this extended concept of affectivity cf. Schmitz et al.,
2011).
2. Emotions imply two components of bodily resonance:
• a centripetal or affective component, i.e., being affected,
“moved” or “touched” by an event through various forms
of bodily sensations (e.g., the blushing and “burning” of
shame);
• a centrifugal or “emotive” component, i.e., a bodily action
readiness, implying specific tendencies of movement and
directedness (e.g., hiding, avoiding the other’s gaze, “sinking
into the floor” from shame).
On this basis, feelings may be regarded as circular interactions
or feedback cycles between centripetal affection and centrifugal
e-motion (cf. Figure 1). Being affected by affective affordances
of a situation triggers a specific bodily resonance (“affection”)
which in turn influences the emotional perception and evalua-
tion of the situation and implies a corresponding action readiness
(“e-motion”). Affective intentionality consists in the entire inter-
active cycle, which is mediated by the resonance of the feeling
body. Thus, in affectivity we aremoved by movement (impression,
affection) and moved to move (expression, e-motion), indicating
the kinetic-kinaesthetic ambiguity of the body (Sheets-Johnstone,
1999).
3. Bodily resonance thus acts as the medium of our affective
engagement in a given situation. It imbues, taints and per-
meates the perception of this situation without necessarily
stepping into the foreground. In Polanyi’s terms, bodily reso-
nance is the proximal, and the perceived situation is the distal,
component of affective intentionality, with the proximal com-
ponent receding from awareness in favor of the distal (Polanyi,
1967). This may be compared to the sense of touch which is
at the same time a self-feeling of the body (“proximal”) and a
feeling of the touched surface (“distal”); or to the subliminal
experience of thirst (“proximal”) which first becomes con-
spicuous as the perceptual salience of water flowing nearby
(“distal”).
4. If the resonance or affectability of the body is modified in
specific ways, this will change the person’s affective percep-
tion accordingly. This is the common basis of the studies on
embodiment and emotions that we mentioned above. Thus,
a lack of resonance (e.g., after injection of botulinum toxin)
will impede the perception of corresponding affective affor-
dances in the environment. Conversely, increasing a certain
bodily feeling (e.g., holding a hot cup of coffee), adopting a
certain position or moving in a certain way favors the corre-
lated affective perception. Thus, the different components of
the affection-intention-motion cycle influence one another.
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FIGURE 1 | Embodied affectivity. We use phenomenological terminology
in the model; in psychological terminology subject could be replaced by
person, and affection by affect. Expression is constitutive of e-motion
(centrifugal), impression is constitutive of affection (centripetal), resulting in
interoceptive and proprioceptive body feedback or bodily resonance (arrows
in subject). Emotion is mediated by the expressive ability (e.g., Laban,
1980), and affection is mediated by the permeability of the person system
(Lewin, 1935). Both expression and impression (Wallbott, 1990) constitute
the unity of movement and perception (cf. Weizsäcker, 1940), and form an
integral part of our personality.
The last point is of particular psychotherapeutic importance, for
it shows that emotions may not only be influenced by cognitive
means (i.e., by changing the cognitive component of the cycle),
but also by modifying the bodily resonance. It can be diminished
as well as increased. The first is the case in habitual body defences:
When an emotion emerges, one often tends to defend against it by
bodily counteraction: suppressing one’s tears or cries, compress-
ing one’s lips, tightening one’s muscles, keeping a stiff posture,
“pulling oneself together,” etc. This often happens unconsciously,
as part of one’s early acquired bodily habitus (cf. Bourdieu, 1990).
On the other hand, the experience of vague or diffuse emotions
may be enhanced and differentiated by carefully attending to the
bodily feelings and kinaesthetic tendencies which these emotions
imply, in order to render them accessible to verbal explication in
psychotherapy.
In concluding the section, we may add that the connections
of affectivity and embodiment that we have presented in a gen-
eral model show considerable cultural and individual variations.
The culture-specific forms of emotional expression or restraint
as well as the habitus of a person which has incorporated basic
attitudes such as introversion or extroversion, shyness or pride,
submissiveness or dominance, etc., have become part of the
individual body memory (Fuchs, 2012) and thus influence the
circular relations between affective affordances, bodily resonance
and emotional response in a given situation. Here lies a rich field
for future research into the impact of culture and biography on
the embodiment of emotions.
INTERAFFECTIVITY
As we have seen, emotions imply embodied action tendencies.
More specifically, in the social sphere they are characterized by
various potential movements toward, or away from, an actual or
implicit other (Kafka, 1950; De Rivera, 1977), i.e., they are essen-
tially relational. As such, they are not only felt from the inside,
but also displayed and visible in expression and behavior, often
as bodily tokens or rudiments of action5. The facial, gestural and
postural expression of a feeling is part of the bodily resonance
that feeds back into the feeling itself, but also induces processes of
interaffectivity:Our body is affected by the other’s expression, and
we experience the kinetics and intensity of his emotions through
our own bodily kinaesthesia and sensation.
Emotions thus imply two components of bodily resonance or
feedback:
• Self- or individual resonance: proprio- and interoceptive feed-
back providing the organism with useful information from
body postures, gestures or sensations (Zajonc and Markus,
1984; Hatfield et al., 1994: the body as “interface” between
cognition and affect).
• Interactional or interbodily resonance: dynamic mutual feed-
back between two bodies (e.g., you lift your arms and I feel
slightly “uplifted”). This body feedback can occur through the
visual, auditory or tactile channel (such as from a handshake or
an embrace; Koch, unpublished Manuscript), but also through
the kinaesthetic channel (such as from directional movements;
e.g., Koch et al., 2011).
This means that in every social encounter, two cycles of embod-
ied affectivity (cf. Figure 1 above) become intertwined, thus
continuously modifying each subject’s affective affordances and
resonance. This complex process may be regarded as the bodily
basis of empathy and social understanding.
To illustrate this (Figure 2), let us assume that the SELF (A) is a
person whose emotion, e.g., anger, manifests itself in typical bod-
ily (facial, gestural, interoceptive, etc.) changes. He feels the anger
as the tension in his face, the sharpness of his voice, the arousal
in his body etc. This resonance is an expression of the emotion at
the same time, i.e., the anger becomes visible and is perceived as
such by the OTHER (B). But what is more, the expression will
also produce an impression, namely by triggering corresponding
or complementary bodily feelings in the OTHER. Thus, A’s sinis-
ter gaze, the sharpness of his voice or expansive bodily movements
might induce in B an unpleasant tension or even a jerk, a tendency
5According to (Darwin, 1872/1904), emotional expressions once served par-
ticular action functions (e.g., baring one’s teeth in anger to prepare for attack),
but now accompany emotions in rudimentary ways in order to communi-
cate these emotions to others. Evolutionary psychologists have advanced the
hypothesis that hominids have evolved both with increasingly differentiated
facial expressions and with sophisticated capabilities of understanding these
affect displays. In any case, though strongly varying between and within cul-
tures, emotional expression is a crucial facet of interpersonal communication
in all societies.
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FIGURE 2 | Interaffectivity. The figure is an integration of Koch (2011),
Froese and Fuchs (2012), and Fuchs (2013). Interaffectivity includes body
feedback (i.e., the impression function within self and other) which is
necessary for interbodily resonance. Components of interbodily resonance
are: mirroring or complementing movements, body awareness (via
proprioceptive body feedback), and kinaesthetic empathy; they are
psychotherapeutically important in phenomena such as somatic
countertransference (Pallaro, 2002).
to withdraw, etc. (similarly, shame that one witnesses may induce
embarrassed aversion, sadness a tendency to connect and console,
and so forth). Thus, B not only sees the emotions in the A’s face
and gesture, but also senses it with his own body, through his own
bodily resonance.
However, it does not stay like this, for the impression and
bodily reaction caused in B in turn becomes an expression for
A. It will immediately affect his bodily reaction, change his own
expression, however slightly (e.g., increasing or decreasing his
expression of anger), and so forth. This creates a circular interplay
of expressions and reactions running in split seconds and con-
stantly modifying each partner’s bodily state. They have become
parts of a dynamic sensorimotor and interaffective system that
connects both bodies in interbodily resonance or intercorporal-
ity (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Of course, the signals and reactions
involved proceed far too quickly to become conscious as such.
Instead, both partners will experience a specific feeling of being
connected with the other in a way that may be termed “mutual
incorporation” (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009). Each lived and felt
body reaches out, as it were, to be extended by the other. In both
partners, their own bodily resonance mediates the perception
of the other. It is in this sense that we can refer to the experi-
ence of the other in terms of an embodied perception, which,
through the interaction process, is at the same time an embodied
communication.
No mental representation is necessary for this process. There
is no strict separation between the inner and the outer, as if a hid-
den mental state in X produced certain external signs, which Y
would have to decipher. For X’s anger may not be separated from
its bodily expression; and similarly, Y does not perceive X’s body
as a mere object, but as a living, animate and expressive body that
she/he is coupled with.
Nor is a simulation required for the process of mutual incor-
poration. We certainly do not simulate the other’s angry gaze or
voice, even less his anger, but rather feel tense, threatened or even
invaded by his expressive bodily behavior. Bodily sensations, ten-
sions, action tendencies, etc. that arise in the interaction do not
serve as a separate simulation of the other person, but are fed
into the mutual perception. In Polanyi’s terms, one could also say
that the felt bodily resonance is the proximal, the other’s perceived
body is the distal component of one’s empathic perception, with
the proximal component receding from awareness in favor of the
distal (Polanyi, 1967). Stuart (2012) has recently coined the term
“enkinesthesia,” that means, “feeling one’s own movements into
the other,” or: empathy through subliminal co-movement. It is
in this sense that we can refer to the experience of the other in
terms of “embodied” perception, which, through the interaction
process, is at the same time an “embodied” communication. In
Merleau-Ponty’s account:
“The communication or comprehension of gestures comes
about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures
of others, of my gestures and the intentions discernible in the
conduct of other people. It is as if the other person’s intentions
inhabited my body and mine his” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).
As we can see, the concept of mutual incorporation leads to the
opposite of the representationalist account: Primary social under-
standing is not an inner modeling in a detached observer, but the
other’s body extends onto my own, and my own extends onto the
other.
This can perhaps best be studied in early childhood. Emotions
primarily emerge from and are embedded in dyadic interac-
tions of infant and caregiver. Stern (1985) has shown in detail
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FIGURE 3 | Movement rhythms. Example of rhythm writing to capture
affect expression and vitality contours (Kestenberg and Sossin, 1973, 1979;
Stern, 2010).
how emotions are cross-modally expressed, shared, and regu-
lated. Infants and adults experience joint affective states in terms
of dynamic flow patterns, intensities, shapes, and vitality affects
(for example, crescendo or decrescendo, fading, bursting, pulsing,
effortful or easy, etc.) in just the way that music is experienced as
affective dynamics. This includes the tendency to mimic and syn-
chronize each other’s facial expressions, vocalizations, postures,
movements, and thus to converge emotionally (Condon, 1979;
Hatfield et al., 1994). All this may be summarized by the terms
affect attunement and interaffectivity (Stern, 1985; p. 132): The
emerging affect during a joyful playing situation between mother
and infant may not be divided and distributed among them. It
arises from the “in-between,” or from the over-arching process in
which both are immersed. Affect attunement is carried by kinaes-
thetic empathy (Kestenberg, 1975; Fischman, 2008), which is also
employed in dance/movement therapy diagnostics and interven-
tion (for a systematization of forms of attunement and mirroring
see Eberhard-Kaechele, 2012).
Affect attunement was first investigated by Kestenberg (1975);
Kestenberg and Sossin (1973, 1979), who systematized it into
quality and shape attunement and described developmental reg-
ularities and sequences. Kestenberg emphasized that in the indi-
viduation process, partial attunement of mother and child was
more productive than complete attunement to serve the child’s
development. A basic dimension of meaning are smooth vs. sharp
reversals between rhythms (Koch, 2011). Via kinaesthetic empa-
thy, researchers can notate body rhythms (Figure 3) that may
be used to analyse affect attunement differentially (Koch, 2014).
These rhythm curves reflect what Stern calls “vitality affects” or
“vitality contours” (Stern, 1985, 2010). Shared vitality affects then
form a vital part of our emotions.
Thus, emotions are not inner states that we experience only
individually or that we have to decode in others, but primar-
ily shared states that we experience through interbodily affec-
tion. Even if one’s emotions become increasingly independent
from another’s presence in the course of childhood, intercor-
porality remains the basis of empathy: There is a bodily link
which allows emotions to immediately affect the other and thus
enables empathic understanding without requiring a Theory
of Mind or verbal articulation (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009).
On this basis, we have created a short scale that measures the
degree of feeling understood by and understanding of others
throughmovement. The Embodied Intersubjectivity Scale (EIS; see
Appendix) consists of ten items measuring the degree of close-
ness created by different forms of attuning and mirroring in
movement. It complements the Body Self-Efficacy Scale (BSE; see
Appendix), which measures the body-based “I can’t” of a person
(Husserl, 1952) also with 10 items. Perceived body self-efficacy is
related to a positive body image, positive movement-based affect
(MBAS; Koch, 2014) and the ability for embodied interaffectivity
(Appendix).
(PSYCHO)PATHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
The model of embodied affectivity that we have presented
may gain additional plausibility from different kinds of dis-
turbances which occur in psychopathology. We will illustrate
its implications by using the examples of (1) anxiety disor-
der, (2) depression, (3) Parkinson’s disease, (4) alexithymia, and
(5) autism.
(1) Anxiety disorders are characterized by a heightened alert of
the body which reacts to threatening affective affordances in
the environment with intense feelings of oppression mainly
in throat, breast or gut (corresponding physiologically to
muscular tension, trembling, palpitation, hyperventilation,
sweating, etc.)6. This bodily affection motivates, on the one
hand, a hypervigilant perception: The anxious person scans
the environment for threatening cues and anticipates lurk-
ing danger. On the other hand, the bodily resonance also
implies a specific action tendency, namely to escape the
oppressing situation through flight or to avoid it in advance.
Phobias particularly related to space, such as agoraphobia,
claustrophobia or acrophobia, dynamize the otherwise static
quality of experienced space and illustrate the overall spatial
structure of anxiety as encompassing body and environment.
(2) In contrast, a lack or loss of bodily affectability is charac-
teristic of severe depression. The constriction, rigidity and
missing tension-flow modulation (neutral flow; Kestenberg,
1975) of the lived body in depression leads to a general emo-
tional numbness and finally to affective depersonalization
(Fuchs, 2005). The deeper the depression, the more the affec-
tive qualities and atmospheres of the environment fade. The
patients are no longer capable of being moved and affected
by things, situations or other persons. They complain of a
painful indifference, a “feeling of not feeling” and of not
being able to sympathize with their relatives any more. In his
autobiographical account, Solomon describes his depression
as “. . . a loss of feeling, a numbness, (which) had infected
all my human relations. I didn’t care about love; about my
work; about family; about friends . . . ” (Solomon, 2001;
p. 45). Thus patients feel disconnected from the world; they
6Similarly, in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) there is an increased bod-
ily responsivity (racing heart, dyspnea, fear-sweat, sickness) to certain envi-
ronmental triggers that are related to former traumatic experiences (sights,
sounds, smells, etc.), that means, the body resonance is shaped by a traumatic
body memory (van der Kolk, 1994; Fuchs, 2012).
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lose their participation in the interaffective space that we
normally share with others (Fuchs, 2013).
(3) In some way similar to depression, we find in progressed
Parkinson’s disease a “freezing” of face and body, which leads
to loss of emotional expressivity. As a result, patients tend
to experience a decreased intensity of their emotions and
complain of no longer being able to participate in interaffec-
tive exchange with others as before. Studies have also found
that patients with Parkinson’s disease were less accurate than
healthy controls in decoding angry, sad and disgusted facial
expressions of others, pointing to a lack of bodily reso-
nance as the proximal component of affective perception (see
Mermillod et al., 2011, for an overview).
(4) Persons characterized by alexithymia have marked difficul-
ties to identify, differentiate and describe their own emo-
tions, while at the same time being unable to recognize the
affective nature of bodily sensations associated with certain
emotions (Taylor and Taylor, 1997). This is often accompa-
nied by a lack of understanding of the feelings of others,
which leads to unempathic emotional responding (Hesse and
Floyd, 2008). Alexithymia is particularly frequent in patients
with somatoform disorders who are have often problems to
relate their bodily resonance to corresponding affective situa-
tions, leading to detached feelings of pressure, burning, pain,
etc., which are then attributed to assumed somatic illnesses
(Duddu et al., 2003). Moreover, interoceptive sensitivity,
measured as a person’s ability to accurately perceive one’s
heartbeats at rest, has been found to be reduced in somato-
form patients which was associated with a reduced capacity
of emotional self-regulation (Pollatos et al., 2011; Weiß et al.,
2014). Interoceptive sensitivity normally facilitates success-
ful self-regulation by providing a fine-tuned feedback of the
present emotional state (Füstös et al., 2011).
What is obviously lacking in alexithymia is the proximal-
distal structure of affective intentionality: Whereas bodily
resonance normally functions as the proximal medium of
our affective perception, for alexithymic patients their bodily
reactions seem unrelated to affective affordances of a given
situation, which means that the full circle of affectivity does
not come about. Bodily sensations of resonance either are not
felt at all, or they may come to the fore separately, instead of
receding from awareness in favor of affective intentionality. In
both cases, this is connected to a sense of emotional detach-
ment of patients from themselves. Pathogenetically, a lack
of interaffective mirroring and feedback in early childhood
seems to play a major role: If caregivers are incapable of rec-
ognizing and validating emotional expressions in the child,
this can impair the child’s capacity to understand and differ-
entiate emotional states within himself as well as in others
(Graerne and Bagby, 2000).
(5) Finally, autism or autistic spectrum disorder may be regarded
as a disturbance of embodied interaffectivity, namely as a
lack of perceiving others’ expressions, gestures and voic-
ings in terms of affective affordances. Correspondingly, eye
tracking studies have shown that children with autism focus
on inanimate and irrelevant details of interactive situations
while missing the relevant social cues, e.g., neglecting the
eyes and mouths of protagonists (Klin et al., 2002). Another
study asked children to sort people who varied in terms of
age, sex, facial expressions of emotion and the hat that they
were wearing (Weeks and Hobson, 1987). In contrast to typi-
cal children who grouped pictures by emotional expressions,
the participants with autism grouped the people by the type
of hat they were wearing. Generally, they prefer to attend to
inanimate objects over other humans (Klin et al., 2003; Jones
et al., 2008). Furthermore, while imitation and co-movement
serves as a major instrument for early affect attunement and
social cognition, several studies have found that autistic chil-
dren do not readily imitate the actions of others (Smith and
Bryson, 1994; Hobson and Lee, 1999).
As a result of these deficiencies, there is a general lack of
the embodied or kinaesthetic empathy that normally medi-
ates the affective perception of the other. The feedback
cycles of mutual incorporation are not achieved; instead,
for children with autism the others remain rather myste-
rious, detached objects whose behavior is troublesome to
predict. According to embodied and enactive approaches,
what these children primarily lack is not a theoretical con-
cept of others’ minds (Klin et al., 2003; Gallagher, 2004;
De Jaegher, 2013). This is supported by the fact many
autistic symptoms such as lack of emotional contact, anx-
iety or agitation are already present in the first years of
life, i.e., long before the supposed age of 4–5 years to
acquire a Theory of Mind. Much rather, high-functioning
autistic persons often develop precisely an explicit “Theory
of Mind” approach to emotions, i.e., they learn to infer
or “figure out” what emotion the other is experiencing
(Grandin, 1995).
EMBODIED THERAPIES
Our model of embodied affectivity can be elucidating for the
interpersonal processes taking place on a non-verbal level in
psychotherapy and for the explicit thematization of bodily expe-
rience in body psychotherapy and dance movement therapy.
These approaches use non-verbal modalities to start change pro-
cesses, to gain access to affect and memories that dominated in
a former situation—actualizations that are important, for exam-
ple, in trauma treatment (Caldwell, 2012; Eberhard-Kaechele,
2012). Embodied therapies are increasingly framed in non-linear
causality, enactive, ecological and dynamic systems approaches
(cf. Koch and Fishman, 2011), to account for the complexity of
motor processes and their interwovenness with brain functions
and sociocultural/environmental factors.
The embodied affectivity model allows us to locate disor-
ders on the continuum of e-motion and affectivity and to plan
embodied interventions accordingly. Anxiety (1) for example, can
be addressed and be alleviated by engagement in low intensity
and gradual swaying movements—particularly with advancing
movement in the horizontal plane—which are part of many med-
itative circle dances (Koch, 2011), strengthening their ability to
calm down and perceive their environment as less threatening.
Depression (2) can be temporarily alleviated by moving into high
arousal, high intensity, abrupt movements with round reversals
(such as in jogging or dancing) particularly in the vertical plane
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(Koch et al., 2007) which awakens joy and vitality, and decreases
negative affect. Persons affected from Parkinson (3) profit from
Tango Argentino (Duncan and Earhart, 2012),—characterized
by its mostly low intensity abrupt movements and turns with
flow adjustment, which address initiation, balance and gait,
but also intersubjective sensitivity,—and from expressive dance
training, which strengthens their expressive abilities. Alexithymia
(4) is common in both somatoform and autistic populations.
Somatoform patients benefit from structured authentic move-
ment interventions (The Body Mind Approach (TBMA), Payne
and Stott, 2010) including a partner exchange, which support
the connections between feeling and verbalization; and autists
(5) from mirroring in movement—including structured authen-
tic movement—, which can improve their intersubjective abilities
(Koch et al., 2014b). This mostly evidence-based literature on the
effects of movement therapy on (psycho-)pathological conditions
has been summarized in Koch et al. (2014a).
Dance movement therapy starts on the moving and e-motion
side (e.g., Levy, 2005), whereas embodied therapies such as focus-
ing (Gendlin, 1967) and functional relaxation (Fuchs, 1997) start
on the sensing and affectivity side of the model. Most expe-
rienced body psychotherapists—no matter which background
they work from—integrate both sides in a balance of sens-
ing and moving (e.g., Lahmann et al., 2010; Caldwell, 2012).
A focus on breathing can help find the basis of this balance
(e.g., Williams et al., 2007). Rogers (1951) already pointed out
that persons entering into a sensing, reflective, and affective
mode during the process of therapy, pausing and giving room
to integrate the bodily feedback into the progression of a ther-
apeutic session, are the ones that profit most from psychother-
apy. Damasio (1994, 1996), in his somatic marker hypothesis,
specified that no decision of practical relevance can produce
authentic results without interoceptive and proprioceptive feed-
back from the body. Embodied therapies can help the individual
to access this somatic information and to take it into account
for daily living—a step that becomes increasingly difficult for
many persons inWestern societies with their largely exteroceptive
focus.
CONCLUSION
In sum, emotions result from the body’s own feedback and the
circular interaction between affective affordances in the environ-
ment and the subject’s bodily resonance, be it in the form of
sensations, postures, expressive movements, or movement ten-
dencies. Through its resonance, the body functions as a medium
of emotional perception.
Our account places particular emphasis on the intersubjec-
tive dimension of affectivity. In interaffectivity, our body is tacitly
affected by the other’s expression, and we experience the kinetics
and intensity of his emotions through our own bodily kinaes-
thesia and sensation. This means that in every social encounter,
two cycles of embodied affectivity become intertwined, thus
continuously modifying each partner’s affective affordances and
resonance. Infant research demonstrates how the mutual bod-
ily resonance of facial, gestural and vocal expression engenders
our primary affective attunement to others. From birth on, the
body is embedded in intercorporality, and thus becomes the
medium of interaffectivity. Hence, affects are not enclosed in an
inner mental sphere to be deciphered from outside, but come
into existence, change and circulate between self and other in
the interbodily dialog. Emotions are neither individual nor uni-
directional phenomena; they operate in cycles that can involve
multiple people in processes of mutual influence and bonding.
These processes of embodied interaffectivity as well as their dis-
turbances are of major importance for psychiatry, psychosomat-
ics, and psychotherapeutic interactions and can be addressed in
embodied therapies.
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APPENDIX
BODY SELF-EFFICACY-SCALE (BSE; KOCH, UNPUBLISHED
MANUSCRIPT)
Please answer how the following statements apply to you on a
scale from 0 to 5 with 0 representing “applies not at all” and 5
representing “applies exactly”:
1. I can move well. 0 1 2 3 4 5
2. My movements are beautiful. 0 1 2 3 4 5
3. My body is flexible. 0 1 2 3 4 5
4. I have many bodily constraints. 0 1 2 3 4 5
5. My body is lifeless and inert/numb. 0 1 2 3 4 5
6. I can easily jump over an obstacle of
medium size.
0 1 2 3 4 5
7. My body feels like “in pieces.” 0 1 2 3 4 5
8. My body often feels like it does not
belong to me.
0 1 2 3 4 5
9. I can move elegantly/with grace. 0 1 2 3 4 5
10. I can express myself in movement. 0 1 2 3 4 5
Internal Consistency BSE: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75 (students; n = 63) and 0.83
(patients; n = 83) on the German version.
EMBODIED INTERSUBJECTIVITY SCALE (EIS; KOCH, UNPUBLISHED
MANUSCRIPT)
Please think about the last situation in which you have moved
with others in a group (e.g., in movement therapy, in dancing). In
how far did the following statements apply to you on a scale from
0 to 5 with 0 representing “applies not at all” and 5 representing
“applies exactly”:
1. I can pick up the movements of others. 0 1 2 3 4 5
2. Through movement I can
transmit/communicate aspects of myself.
0 1 2 3 4 5
3. Through the movement of others, I
realize how they feel (e.g., joy, tension).
0 1 2 3 4 5
4. I can accompany others in movement
(“mirror” movement).
0 1 2 3 4 5
5. I can recognize how others feel through
joint movement.
0 1 2 3 4 5
6. Through joint movement a
connectedness arises.
0 1 2 3 4 5
7. If others move in synch with me, I feel
accepted by them.
0 1 2 3 4 5
8. Something new can emerge in moving
with others.
0 1 2 3 4 5
9. I can understand, what others want to
express with movement.
0 1 2 3 4 5
10. If another person moves in synch with
me I feel understood.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Internal Consistency EIS: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87 (students; n = 63) and
0.90 (patients; n = 83) on the German version.
Both measures had been pretested in a longer version on a
sample of 80 psychology students at the University of Heidelberg
and had been cut down from an item pool of twice the amount of
items using the criterion of internal consistency scores. Both, the
BSE and the EIS, were then tested with a sample of 63 students
of therapy sciences at SRH University of Heidelberg, resulting in
a Cronbach’s alpha (BSE) of 0.75; and a Cronbach’s alpha (EIS)
of 0.87 (Kelbel, unpublished thesis). They were further employed
in the context an RCT on movement therapy with schizophrenic
and autistic populations (n = 83; 42 schizophrenic patients and
41 Autism Spectrum Disorder, mostly high functioning) and
were found reliable for these patient groups (Cronbach’s alpha
BSE = 0.83; Cronbach’s alpha EIS = 0.90; Kelbel, unpublished
thesis).
The BSE (of both student and patient sample data) was vali-
dated with the Ryckman Scale (Ryckman et al., 1982) a standard-
ized questionnaire on perceived physical ability. The two scales
showed a correlation of r = 0.55, p< 0.01, indicating high agree-
ment, even though, Ryckman et al. did not cover the aesthetic
aspects included in the BSE.
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